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NOTES 
The Public Safety Exception to Miranda: Analyzing 
Subjective Motivation · 
Marc Schuyler Reiner 
INTRODUCTION 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 1 the Supreme Court announced a set of 
procedural safeguards to protect a criminal suspect's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination when being questioned by 
the police. The Court required that when "an individual is taken 
into .custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities 
in any significant way and is subjected to questioning," the police 
must give the suspect the now-familiar pre-interrogation Miranda 
warnings.2 The Court subsequently made it clear that Miranda 
warnings were required in every instance of custodial interroga-
tion.3 In New York v. Quarles, 4 however, the Court created a "pub-
lic safety" exception to the Miranda requirements for situations 
where a threat to public safety compels the police to question a 
criminal suspect immediately. 
In Quarles, a young woman approached two police officers and 
informed them that she had just been raped. She described the per-
petrator and told the police that he had just entered a nearby super-
market and that he was carrying a gun. A policeman - Officer 
Frank Kraft - went to the store and discovered a man - Benja-
min Quarles - who matched the description given by the woman. 
A chase ensued and Kraft temporarily lost sight of Quarles. Upon 
:finding Quarles again, the police arrested him. Kraft frisked 
Quarles and found an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing 
Quarles, Kraft asked him about the location of the gun. Quarles 
responded "the gun is over there," gesturing to some empty car-
tons. Kraft retrieved the handgun and then foqnally arrested 
Quarles and read him his Miranda rights. Quarles waived his rights 
and then admitted that he owned the gun.s 
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2. 384 U.S. at 478. The suspect "must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to 
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 U.S. at 444. 
3. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 
(1966). 
4. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
5. 467 U.S. at 651-52. 
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During pretrial proceedings on weapons charges, the trial court 
suppressed Quarles's initial and later statements, finding a Miranda 
violation because the police had failed to advise him of his rights 
before questioning.6 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the 
suppression ruling and, as part of this ruling, also explicitly refused 
to recognize a public safety exception to the Miranda requirements 
because they felt there was no evidence that the officer's motive 
was to protect either his own safety or the public's safety.7 
The Supreme Court reversed, creating a "public safety" excep-
tion to the Miranda requirements.8 The Court held that the need 
for answers in a situation presenting a threat to public safety out-
weighs the protections afforded by the Miranda warnings.9 In cre-
ating a public safety exception to the Miranda requirements, the 
Quarles Court sought to allow officers to obtain information neces-
sary to defuse an emergency. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion 
declined to force an arresting officer in a hectic situation to choose 
between concern for public safety and desire to obtain a 
conviction.10 
There is considerable confusion among commentators and lower 
courts about how to decide whether the public safety exception is 
applicable to a particular case. Many have interpreted Quarles as 
prohibiting any inquiry into an interrogating officer's subjective be-
liefs and motivations; they claim to look only for objectively reason-
able indicia of danger in applying the public safety exception.11 
Courts generally consider the facts of Quarles - the unknown 
whereabouts of a weapon in a public place - to be an appropri-
ately objective emergency for these courts. 
This Note argues, however, that the appropriate inquiry under 
Quarles is whether an actual and reasonable belief in an emergency 
motivated the interrogating officer. This Note proposes a two-
prong test to facilitate this inquiry. The subjective motivation prong 
evaluates the officer's subjective motivation as revealed by objec-
tive factors: the. content of the officer's questions, when he asked 
them, and when the suspect received Miranda warnings. The objec-
tive reasonableness prong looks at the objective circumstances to 
determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief in an 
emergency. 
6. 467 U.S. at 652-53. For undisclosed reasons, the state failed to pursue rape charges. 
467 U.S. at 652 n.2. 
7. People v. Quarles, 444 N.E.2d 984 (N.Y. 1982), revd., 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see also 467 
U.S. at 653. 
8. 467 U.S. at 655-56. 
9. 467 U.S. at 653. 
10. 467 U.S. at 657-58. 
11. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text. 
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Part I demonstrates that the Quarles opinion actually contem-
plates and requires analysis of the officer's subjective motivation 
and therefore comports with this Note's test. Part II then fully de-
scribes the subjective motivation prong of this Note's test; it out-
lines which objective factors are most probative of the officer's 
subjective intent. Part ID outlines the objective reasonableness 
prong of this Note's test; it argues that the perceived danger must 
be both reasonably substantial and reasonably imminent in order to 
satisfy this prong. Part IV then argues that courts have implicitly or 
explicitly looked to an officer's subjective motivation and that do-
ing so best comports with the policies of Miranda and Quarles. 
I. How THE QUARLES OPINION APPROVES OF EXAMINING 
SUBJECTIVE MOTIVATION 
A very common misinterpretation of the Quarles opinion is that 
it disclaims entirely any inquiry into an officer's subjective motiva-
tion.12 The courts that have prohibited subjective analysis primarily 
rely on a single passage in Quarles. Section I.A argues that the con-
text of that passage actually suggests the necessity of a subjective 
analysis. Section I.B then argues that other parts of the opinion 
clearly require that the officer has a proper subjective motivation in 
order for the public safety exception to apply. 
A. Context of the Apparent Disclaimer 
Several commentators and lower courts that have interpreted 
the Quarles opinion as denying a subjective inquiry rely upon the 
following language from Quarles: "[T]he availability of [the public 
safety] exception does not depend upon the motivation of the indi-
vidual officers involved."13 Rather than interpreting this language 
12. See, e.g., Scott Lewis, Miranda Today: Death of a Talisman, PRosECUTOR 18, 20 
(SeptJOct. 1994) ("The officer's subjective motivation for inquiring is irrelevant.") (citation 
omitted}; Supreme Court Announces "Public Safety" Exception to Miranda, 52 U.S.L.W. 
1193, 1194 (June 19, 1984) [hereinafter Supreme Court Announces] ("This public safety ex-
ception to Miranda carries with it an objective standard ...• [T]he particular officer's subjec-
tive motive in questioning the suspect is unimportant."). 
13. 467 U.S. at 656. This Note will hereinafter refer to this brief passage as the apparent 
disclaimer. 
For a list of courts that misinterpret the disclaimer, see infra notes 96-105 and accompany-
ing text. Most of those courts will nonetheless make inquiry into the arresting officer's moti-
vation and even consider the motivation to be a determinative factor. 
Commentators have also stated that Quarles requires an objective inquiry. Most of the 
commentaries reaching this conclusion were published immediately after Quarles, and are 
generally Comments or Notes analyzing recent Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., John Ran-
dolph Bode, Comment, New York v. Quarles: The "Public Safety" Exception to Miranda, 19 
U. RICH. L. REv. 193, 201-03 (1984) ("The Quarles Court stated that the availability of the 
'public safety' exception should be based on an objective review of the circumstances sur-
rounding the custodial interrogation."); Stephen S. Goodman IV, Note, Criminal Law -
Fifth Amendment Miranda Warnings - An Exception to Administering Miranda Warnings 
Exists Where Police Questioning is Prompted by Concern for Public Safety, 16 ST. MARY'S 
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to mean that an officer's motivation is irrelevant, the immediate 
context suggests that an arresting officer's improper motivation will 
not invalidate the public safety exception so long as his actions are 
also reasonably prompted by a genuine concern for public safety.14 
L.J. 489, 500-01 (1985) (finding an objective test, despite the subjective test outlined in its 
title: "The existence of the 'public safety' exception was not dependent upon the subjective 
motivations of an officer •... "); Mary M. Keating, Note, New York v. Quarles: The Dissolu-
tion o/Miranda, 30 VILL. L. REv. 441, 458 (1985) ("The Quarles Court found that the availa-
bility of the public safety exception did not depend upon the subjective motivation of the 
individual officers involved. Thus, the determination of whether a public safety exigency 
existed was a question for the court, and not the arresting officer."); Sidney M. Mccrackin, 
Note, New York v. Quarles: The Public Safety Exception to Miranda, 59 Tur.. L. REv. 1111, 
1123 (1985) ("Nor does public safety have to be a motive of the questioners; the majority 
specifically refuses to inquire into the motives of the questioners.") (footnote omitted); James 
G. Scotti, In re John C. - An Opportunity for the New York Courts to Save Miranda from the 
Public Safety Exception, 62 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 143, 149 (1987) (maintaining that the Court 
"adopted an objective test"). 
Despite concluding that the public safety exception relies on a purely objective analysis, 
many of these commentators recognized that the Quarles opinion contemplates, and even 
necessitates, inquiry into subjective motivation. See Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evi-
dence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Un-
constitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REv. 907, 924 (1989) (suggesting that the Court 
based its ruling on the presence of the proper motivation by the arresting officer); cf. Bode, 
supra, at 202 n.62 ("[T]he intent of the police is [not] irrelevant in determining the availabil-
ity of the exception. The subjective intent will probably constitute an important factor in the 
objective analysis."). 
14. Most commentators have failed to recognize that a proper subjective motivation by 
an officer will excuse a simultaneous improper motivation. See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a Rescue Situation, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
567, 580 (1985) ("[T]he Court emphasized that the subjective motivation of the officer is not 
a factor, and courts are to decide whether the particular 'exigency' justified the questions, 
independent of the officer's intent."). But see Loewy, supra note 13, at 924 ("The Court 
apparently permitted Quarles' non-Mirandized statement to be admitted because a legiti-
mate nonevidentiary motive meant that there had been no police misconduct."); Richard K. 
Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 
136 U. PA. L. REv. 729, 810 (1988) ("The officer's alleged perception of danger •.• has now 
become sufficient to suspend Miranda's protection.") (emphasis omitted). 
Those critics who address the Court's discussion of several motives generally fall into two 
categories. The first group insists that the Court prohibits subjective inquiry, but suggests 
that such an inquiry would be an appropriate means of applying the exception. For example, 
Pizzi writes that: 
[A]s long as the officer believed that his actions were immediately necessary to ensure 
public safety and as long as the officer's conduct and belief were reasonable, that ought 
to be the central consideration in the application of a public safety exception, whether or 
not there were other objectives that the officer was trying to achieve at the same time. 
Pizzi, supra, at 583 (footnote omitted). They analogize to self-defense, where one of the 
motives must be self-preservation, but other motives may also be present. Id. The second 
group assumes that the Quarles Court enunciated a purely objective test that permits im-
proper motives, so long as there was a possibility that the officer was concerned with public 
safety. See, e.g., Scotti, supra note 13, at 149-50 ("[T]he Court adopted an objective test in 
which the exception could be invoked even if the officer's main motive for questioning the 
suspect was to obtain incriminating evidence, so long as the question could have been reason-
ably asked out of a concern for the public safety."); Supreme Court Announces, supra note 
12, at 1194 ("If the officer's question could reasonably be said to have been prompted by a 
concern for public safety, then it passes scrutiny."). 
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When an officer has several motives, the presence of an improper 
motive is not determinative of whether the exception applies.15 
The context of the surrounding language in Quarles bears out 
this interpretation.16 The Court, in explaining the role subjective 
analysis should play, anticipated that an officer may have several 
motives: "Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in Officer 
Kraft's position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and 
largely unverifiable motives - their own safety, the safety of 
others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating evi-
dence from the suspect."17 The Court listed the first two motives -
their own safety and public safety - as appropriate instinctive con-
cerns for an arresting officer by stating that an officer 
"[u]ndoubtedly ... would act" based upon them. Thus the Court 
stated that the appropriate time for a court to apply the exception is 
when an officer is "placed in Officer Kraft's position" - when he is 
acting on one of these motives. By permitting the officer to act 
"perhaps as well" out of an incriminatory purpose, the Court was 
merely acknowledging the myriad of motivations upon which a po-
lice officer may act. 
The next paragraph of the opinion further outlines the appropri-
ate situation for the exception's application and confirms the above 
analysis. The Court continued: "Whatever the motivation of indi-
vidual officers in such a situation, we do not believe that the doctri-
nal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its 
rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably 
prompted by a concern for the public safety."18 The language -
"whatever the motivation of individual officers" - might appear to 
disclaim an analysis of their motivation, but the same sentence 
15. Quarles cited other situations where the presence of certain motives by an officer was 
similarly not determinative. 467 U.S. at 656 n.6 (whether "interrogation" occurred, whether 
a "seizure" occurred, and whether "search incident to arrest" exception applied}. 
16. The full language of this section of the opinion is as follows: 
We hold that on these facts there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement 
that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evi-
dence, and that the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation 
of the individual officers involved. In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one con-
fronting these officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is 
necessarily the order of the day, the application of the exception which we recognize 
today should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing con-
cerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer. Undoubtedly most police of-
ficers, if placed in Officer Kraft's position, would act out of a host of different, 
instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives - their own safety, the safety of others, and 
perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect. 
Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, we do not believe 
that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a 
situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the 
public safety. 
467 U.S. at 655-56 (citation omitted). 
17. 467 U.S. at 656 (emphasis added). 
18. 467 U.S. at 656. 
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clearly states that the exception only applies when the officers on 
the scene are "reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety." 
In order to determine whether the officers were prompted by such 
a concern, a court must engage in a subjective analysis.19 In this 
context, the language "whatever the motivation" again appears 
merely to permit improper motivation in a situation in which a 
proper motivation is also present. 
When the Court described the proper questions for officers to 
ask, it again suggested that an investigatory motivation is permissi-
ble so long as a concern for safety accompanies it. The Court called 
for police officers to "distinguish almost instinctively between ques-
tions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public 
and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a 
suspect."20 The Court distinguished between these different ques-
tions, implying that the former questions - those questions that 
may be partially motivated by a desire to elicit testimony - are 
permissible, whereas the latter - those with a sole purpose of in-
crimination - must be excluded. By limiting impermissible ques-
tions to those whose sole purpose is to produce incriminatory 
evidence, the Court suggested that the purpose behind a permissi-
ble question must, at least in part, be a genuine belief in a public 
safety emergency.21 
In applying the exception to the facts of Quarles, the Court con-
firmed the argument outlined above. The Court investigated the 
motivation of the arresting officer and permitted an investigatory 
motivation because a concern for safety was also present. The 
Court stated: "Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not 
simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further 
danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun 
in a public area. "22 The Court acknowledged that an improper mo-
tive may have been present - the desire to make a case against the 
suspect - but held that such a motive was permissible when an 
officer also had a proper motive, such as the desire to secure a dan-
gerous weapon.23 
Several lower courts support this Note's interpretation of 
Quarles's apparent disclaimer of an inquiry into subjective motiva-
19. See infra section I.B.3. 
20. 467 U.S. at 658-59 (emphasis added). 
21. Furthermore, the Court's reference to an "instinctive" process by the arresting officer 
appears to contemplate a subjective inquiry. See infra section I.B.2. 
22. 467 U.S. at 657 (emphasis added). Although the concept of need in describing an 
urgent emergency may be purely objective, the Court's assertions that Kraft himself actually 
"needed an answer" seems to assert that he was personally motivated by the emergency. 
23. By permitting the exception, the Court implicitly endorsed this process of analysis. 
See 461 U.S. at 659 ("The facts of this case clearly demonstrate ••• an officer's ability to 
recognize [an emergency]."). 
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tion; they have interpreted the Quarles opinion as disregarding the 
improper motives of an officer so long as a genuine concern for 
public safety also motivates him..24 Other courts tend to put a 
threshold on the officer's motivation; that is, they require the 
proper concern for safety to outweigh the motive to incriminate the 
suspect.25 Quarles, however, does not appear to require that the 
officer's primary purpose be safety, only that such a concern is 
present. 
B. Quarles Endorses Analysis of Subjective Motivation 
A close analysis of Quarles shows that application of the public 
safety exception requires a subjective analysis. Section I.B.1 ob-
serves that the Court created this exception specifically to relieve 
officers of a difficult choice during an emergency - whether to act 
to secure the emergency or to preserve evidence for use at trial. 
This section argues that because this difficult choice only arises 
when an officer has an actual concern for public safety, courts 
should require such a concern. Section I.B.2 contends that by link-
ing the application of the exception to an officer's instincts, the 
Court requires a subjective analysis of those instincts. Section I.B.3 
argues that the Court framed the proper scenario for the exception 
in such a way as to require a proper subjective motivation by the 
arresting officer because the exception only applies in "a situation 
in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a 
concern for public safety."26 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Thurston, 774 F. Supp. 666, 667 (D. Me. 1991) (applying 
Quarles exception when the officer's question "was asked, at least in part, for the protection" 
of the officers); People v. Ingram, 576 N.Y.S.2d 352, 352-53 (App. Div. 1991) (permitting 
question that "was reasonably prompted by a concern [for safety] and was not solely moti-
vated for the purpose of eliciting testimonial evidence"); State v. Harris, 384 S.E.2d 50, 54 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing question that was prompted by a concern for public safety 
and not solely to elicit testimonial evidence); State v. Camacho, 487 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1992) ("The [public safety] exception does not depend on the inquiring officers' motiva-
tions as long as the questions asked are reasonably prompted by a concern for public 
safety."), revd., 501 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1993). 
The fact that courts adopt this interpretation far more readily than commentators do sug-
gests that the latter were overstating the difficulty with which a court may apply a subjective 
analysis. Furthermore, commentators may have overlooked that, in practice, courts will seek 
to rely upon the legitimate instincts of a police officer, as the Quarles Court suggested, when 
determining if an objective emergency existed. 467 U.S. at 658-59. 
25. See Howard v. Garvin, 844 F. Supp. 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that "[t]he 
existence of [information that is potentially indicative of guilt] can hardly forbid the pursuit 
of the primary objective - public safety"); People v. Melvin, 591 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (App. 
Div. 1992) (permitting a question that was "more for the purpose of ascertaining for safety 
reasons the location of the gun, than [for] secur[ing] evidence of a crime"). 
26. 467 U.S. at 656. 
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1. The Arresting Officer's Difficult Choice 
The difficult choice that the Quarles Court sought to eliminate 
does not exist unless an actual belief in an emergency motivates the 
arresting officer. One of the primary reasons the Court created the 
public safety exception was to avoid situations where an officer had 
to choose between preserving either the public safety or the admis-
sibility of evidence.27 The Court recognized that, when confronted 
with a public safety emergency, an officer will have to decide 
whether to risk losing lives or to risk losing incriminating evidence. 
The Quarles Court fashioned the public safety exception to avoid 
this difficult choice: , 
We decline to place officers ... in the untenable position of having to 
consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society 
for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings 
and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, 
or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility 
of evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their 
ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation 
confronting them.28 
The exception is unnecessary when the officer does not actually be-
lieve in an emergency, and thus does not have to engage in the bal-
ancing process that the Court sought to prevent. Because the 
exception is unnecessary when belief in an emergency does not mo-
tivate the officer, courts should analyze the officer's motivation 
before allowing the exception. 
Quarles focuses on the arresting officer's on-the-scene balancing 
process, making an investigation into the officer's actual belief at 
the crime scene a prerequisite for applying the exception. The 
Court assumed the arresting officer actually believed that an emer-
gency existed, or else he would have been unable to "consider" the 
difficult question.29 Similarly, in its initial justification for creating 
the public safety exception, the Quarles Court weighed the "con-
cern for public safety" against the "prophylactic rules" of Mi-
randa. 3o The term "concern" refers directly to the officer's 
subjective motivation.31 Furthermore, when discussing the desira-
bility of creating a "workable rule," the Court noted that the police 
"have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance" the 
27. See Sherwin, supra note 14, at 810 ("[T]he majority in Quarles ••• invit[ed] the police 
officers to engage in, and thus be guided by, the same cosUbenefit discourse used by the 
Court."). 
28. 467 U.S. at 657-58. 
29. 467 U.S. at 657-58. 
30. 467 U.S. at 653. 
31. Admittedly, the Court could be referring to society's concern. It is the police officer, 
however, who must comply with Miranda and it should therefore be his actual concern which 
must overcome its requirements. 
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competing concerns.32 Again, the Court contemplates that an of-
ficer must have an actual belief in an emergency - otherwise the 
officer would not have to reflect on the emergency or balance the 
situation's competing demands. Because the Court repeatedly 
stressed that the officer's difficult choice - which the exception 
was created to eliminate - requires an actual belief in an emer-
gency, a lower court must investigate an officer's beliefs before ap-
plying the public safety exception. 
2. Officers' "Instincts" 
In referring to the officer's "instincts," the Quarles Court invited 
a subjective analysis of the officer's motives. The Court stated that 
the exception would free police officers "to follow their legitimate 
instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the 
public safety."33 By specifying that the officer's instincts must be 
"legitimate," the Court requires lower courts to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate instincts. In order to evaluate these in-
stincts, a court must determine what these instincts actually were. 
Earlier in the opinion, the Court referred to the officer's "motives" 
as "instinctive."34 By extension then, the required analysis of an 
officer's instincts should focus on the officer's subjective motivation. 
3. "Reasonably Prompted" 
By stating that the exception applies when an officer asks ques-
tions that are "reasonably prompted by a concern for the public 
safety,"35 Quarles expressly calls for an inquiry into the officer's 
subjective state of mind. The verb tense for "prompted" indicates 
that the Court contemplated something more than a purely objec-
tive standard. By using the past tense without any qualifiers, the 
Court is requiring that an actual concern for emergency actually did 
prompt the questioning. If the Court had chosen to create a purely 
objective test it would have instead stated that the exception applies 
in "a situation that would reasonably prompt a concern for the pub-
lic safety."36 The Quarles opinion, however, states that the ques-
32. 467 U.S. at 658 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979)). 
33. 467 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added}. 
34. 467 U.S. at 656. 
35. 467 U.S. at 656. 
36. Some commentators who interpret Quarles as endorsing an objective standard para-
phrase this test with that perspective in mind: The exception applies "when the questioning 
of the suspect could have been reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety." 
Scotti, supra note 13, at 145 (emphasis added}; see also Supreme Court Announces, supra 
note 12, at 1194 (framing the test as "[i]f the officer's question could reasonably be said to 
have been prompted by a concern for public safety"). The fact that these commentators 
inaccurately paraphrase the opinion in asserting that Quarles requires a purely objective 
analysis is further evidence that Quarles itself calls for a subjective analysis. 
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tions must have been prompted by an actual concern for public 
safety, rather than an unascertained, potential concern.37 
Lower courts that have interpreted the "reasonably prompted" 
language generally recognize that it requires a subjective belief in 
an emergency.3s In one case, for example, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals noted that although the police "had reason to believe"39 
that an emergency existed, they were "not reasonably prompted by 
concern for public safety."4° Furthermore, even when courts cite 
this language and say they are applying an objective test,41 they 
likely may resolve the case by looking at the officers' subjective 
intent.42 
II. DETERMINING THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S 
SUBJECTIVE MOTIVATION 
Although the test proposed by this Note analyzes the subjective 
motivation of the arresting officer, it does not suffer from the fail-
ings commonly associated with the much-maligned species known 
as "subjective tests."43 One of the major complaints about subjec-
tive standards is their difficulty in application; motivation can be 
quite elusive to determine.44 The prong of this Note's test that eval-
uates subjective motivation, however, looks to purely objective, ex-
ternal evidence of an interrogating officer's motives and, to a 
considerably lesser extent, the officer's testimony. These factors 
are highly illuminative of subjective intent and are not difficult to 
monitor. 
37. Cf. Pizzi, supra note 14, at 580 (noting that the "reasonably prompted" test is a truly 
subjective one, but maintaining nonetheless that the Court disregarded this test when appar-
ently disclaiming subjective analysis). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Alfonso, No. 94 CR.813(HB}, 1995 WL 6225, at •3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1995) (finding that the officers' "valid safety concern" satisfied the "reason-
ably prompted" standard}; Smith v. State, 646 So. 2d 704, 708 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (finding 
that the "reasonably prompted" test was satisfied when the officer's questions were "solely 
for the purpose of determining whether the [suspect] was injured"); People v. Cole, 211 Cal. 
Rptr. 242, 249 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that officer's belief that the suspect had a weapon 
satisfied "reasonably prompted" test). But see State v. Duncan, 866 S.W.2d 510, 511 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1993) ("The public safety exception does not depend on the motivation of the individ-
ual officers involved but rather whether a reasonable officer would ask instinctively to pro-
tect his own safety or the safety of others."). 
39. State v. Hazley, 428 N.W.2d 406, 411 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
40. 428 N.W.2d at 411. 
41. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 598 A.2d 784, 786 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991} (framing the 
"reasonably prompted" test as a "situation wherein a reasonable police officer would have 
perceived as posing a danger"). 
42. Hill, 598 A.2d at 786 (noting the officers acted "out of concern for public safety"). 
43. For a discussion of why subjective tests are so despised, see infra notes 112-16 and 
accompanying text. 
44. See Marla Belson, Note, "Public-Safety" Exception to Miranda: The Supreme Court 
Writes Away Rights, 61 Cm.-KENr L. REV. 577, 584 (1985). 
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The Quarles Court found that an emergency motivated Officer 
Kraft and it created the exception for similar factual situations.4s 
Furthermore, the fact pattern in Quarles presents a paradigm that 
courts can look to in determining the officer's intent. By imposing 
this paradigmatic factual pattern upon varying factual scenarios, 
courts can analyze whether the officer had an actual belief in the 
emergency. Officer Kraft, the arresting officer, found an empty 
holster upon frisking the suspect. He immediately asked where the 
gun was - a question directly limited to the perceived emergency. 
After Quarles responded and Kraft located the gun, Kraft placed 
Quarles under arrest and instantly read him his Miranda rights 
before questioning further.46 Similarly, courts should require of-
ficers to ask questions limited to the perceived emergency, ask them 
immediately, and then promptly give Miranda warnings afterward. 
This Part proposes three factors courts must examine when de-
termining if an actual belief in an emergency motivated the officer: 
First, section II.A argues that the court should analyze the ques-
tions that the officer asked to determine how directly the officer 
focused them on the alleged emergency. Second, section 11.B ex-
plains why the court should examine the immediacy of the officer's 
questions relating to the emergency. Third, section 11.C contends 
that the court should consider how promptly the officer gave the 
Miranda warnings after he or she defused the danger. Although the 
court may consider other factors,47 all of the above factors should 
45. The Quarles opinion often notes that Officer Kraft believed there to be a danger to 
the public safety. The opinion assumes that Kraft's motivation was to defuse an immediate 
danger: "Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question ..• to insure that further danger to 
the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area." 467 U.S. 649, 657 
{1984). In addition, the Court commends Officer Kraft for properly recognizing an emer-
gency situation and asking the appropriate questions: "The facts of this case clearly demon-
strate ••• an officer's ability to recognize [an exigent situation]." 467 U.S. at 659. The Court 
chose to apply the exception "on these facts," thereby encouraging courts to repeat this type 
of subjective analysis. 467 U.S. at 655. Thus, the Court assumed that Officer Kraft acted in 
good faith and that future courts should require that other officers act similarly before apply-
ing the exception. See Pizzi, supra note 14, at 582-83 ("[T]he thrust of the majority opinion 
••. certainly seemed to imply both that the distinction was drawn properly in this case and 
that the purpose for which such questions are asked should be of some importance in decid-
ing whether public safety justified the questions."); Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 
HAR.v. L. RE.v. fl!, 149 {1984} ("Quarles envisions an officer acting in good faith."). 
On the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals decision, reversed in Quarles, does 
not assume that the purpose of the officers was to secure public safety. People v. Quarles, 
444 N.E.2d 984, 985 (N.Y. 1982} ("[T]here is no evidence in the record before us that there 
were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety or that the police interrogation 
was prompted by any such concern."). The New York court did not rule out the possibility of 
a motivation to secure public safety, they simply refused to speculate because the lower 
courts with fact-finding jurisdiction made no factual determination on the matter. 444 
N.E.2d at 985. 
46. 467 U.S. at 652. 
47. For example, if the officer blurts out an "excited utterance" that reveals his genuine 
concern for public safety, the court may use this statement as proof of the officer's actual 
concern for public safety - even though it is not literally questioning that is subject to Mi-
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be present before a court permits the Quarles exception.48 Section 
II.D then argues for an extremely limited use of the officer's testi-
mony in determining intent. 
A. Content of the Questioning 
The most important indicator of an officer's subjective motiva-
tion is the content of his questioning of the suspect. Questions that 
are limited to the scope of the perceived danger strongly indicate a 
belief that the danger was present and that the officer's motive was 
to secure the danger. Conversely, when an officer asks for general 
information, he reveals an incriminatory purpose or, at most, only a 
general concern for safety that is insufficient under Quarles. 49 The 
Quarles opinion certainly supports a test that limits an officer's per-
missible questions to the emergency at hand.so In addition, lower 
randa. See Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 879 (5th Cir.) (Hill, J., concurring) (stating that 
"[i]f the officer's [excited utterance] .•. was the product of shock or surprise, it cannot be 
said that he was seeking infonnation"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980). Factors like these 
are few and far between, however, and courts should not use their potential existence as an 
excuse to deviate from the outlined factors. 
48. The satisfaction of these factors is important not because it is conclusive evidence that 
the officer was concerned for public safety - although it is certainly very persuasive evi-
dence to that conclusion. Rather, the absence of any of these factors is powerful evidence 
that concern for public safety did not motivate the officer. If these factors are not satisfied, 
the officer was probably either delinquent in protecting the suspect's rights or motivated 
solely by an incriminatory purpose. In either of these situations a court should not allow the 
Quarles exception. 
49. Quarles appears to reject general concerns as justification for applying the public 
safety exception. The Court specifically refused to overrule Miranda's assumption that the 
general concern for safety resulting from fewer convictions of guilty suspects was not suffi-
cient to override the added protections of the warnings. 467 U.S. at 656-57; see also Kevin 
Corr, A Law Enforcement Primer on Custodial lnte"ogation, 15 WHrITIER L. REv. 723, 739 
(1994) ("Such questions must deal with true life or death issues and cannot be used as a 
substitute for standard custodial interrogation which requires Miranda warnings."). . 
A court may only rarely derive a concern for safety from general questions. For instance, 
in a hostage or kidnapping situation, it may be imprudent for a police negotiator to ask only 
questions that are specifically directed to the danger. In these situations, the test should be 
that the officer stops questioning after the danger has been secured. See People v. Laliberte, 
615 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); State v. Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d 69, 74-77 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1987). 
50. First, Quarles explicitly states that it is the officer's questions that the applying court 
must monitor for intent. 467 U.S. at 656 (requiring that the officer ask "questions reasonably 
prompted by a concern for the public safety") (emphasis added). In addition, the opinion 
distinguishes questions that are proper - those "necessary to secure ••• safety" - from ones 
that are not - those "designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence." 467 U.S. at 659 (em-
phasis added); see also Goodman, supra note 13, at 506 (interpreting this language from 
Quarles to require the officer "to conform his questioning only to the removal of the dan-
ger"). The Court then goes on to praise Officer Kraft for asking "only the question necessary 
to locate the missing gun," strongly implying that the limiting of his questioning was moti-
vated directly by the perceived emergency. 467 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added). The Court 
further implies that Officer Kraft intentionally limited his questioning to the emergency by 
noting that he did not ask "investigatory questions" until the scene was fully secure and after 
giving Miranda warnings. 467 U.S. at 659. 
The Supreme Court underscored the requirement of carefully limited questions later that 
year in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). In Berkemer, the Court clarified that 
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courts have consistently found the extent of the officer's question-
ing to be determinative of whether they permit the Quarles 
exception.s1 
Quarles pennitted officers to ask only questions "essential to elicit information necessary to 
neutralize the threat to the public." 468 U.S. at 429 n.10. 
51. A court is most likely to pennit the exception when it finds that the officer limited 
questioning to the instant emergency, thereby indicating that his actual concern for danger 
prompted the questioning. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Zavaris, No. 93-1358, 1994 WL 532739, at *3 
(10th Cir. Sept 29, 1994) (pennitting questions that were "limited ... to the location of the 
gun"); United States v. Knox, 950 F.2d 516, 519 {8th Cir. 1991) (permitting a single question 
regarding the location of the weapon); United States v. Gonzalez, 864 F. Supp. 375, 381-82 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) {allowing questions "directed toward determining" the existence of an emer-
gency); Howard v. Garvin, 844 F. Supp. 173, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stressing that the police 
did not ask questions about what the defendant had done, but only about matters affecting 
public safety); United States v. Eaton, 676 F. Supp. 362, 365-66 (D. Me. 1988) {allowing a 
question when the officer "asked the bare minimum necessary to determine the whereabouts 
of the gun"); People v. Gilliard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (Ct App. 1987) (allowing a question 
"specifically directed only to the recovery of the missing gun"); People v. Cole, 211 Cal. Rptr. 
242, 248 (Ct. App. 1985) (permitting a single question about a weapon); In re B.R, 479 
N.E.2d 1084, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct 1985) (refusing to apply the exception when officers' ques-
tioning lasted "between 5 and 10 minutes"); Price v. State, 591N.E.2d1027, 1030 (Ind. 1992) 
(applying the exception when the "only question asked •.• was the location of the weapon"); 
State v. Orso, 789 S.W.2d 177, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) {allowing questions that were "brief 
and limited in scope"); State ex reL A.S., 548 A.2d 202, 205 (NJ. Super. Ct 1988) (allowing 
the exception when the officer conducted only "limited questioning"); People v. Melvin, 591 
N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (App. Div. 1992) (allowing a single direct question about the whereabouts 
of the gun); People v. Hawthorne, 553 N.Y.S2d 799, 800 (App. Div.1990) (same); cf. United 
States v. Veilleux, 846 F. Supp. 149, 154 (D.N.H. 1994) (relying on grounds other than 
Quarles but noting that questioning "limited to the location of defendant's pistol" would 
likely fit the exception); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Minn. 1992) (relying on the 
similar "rescue doctrine," but noting that "the limited scope of the officer's questions sup-
ports a determination that the primary purpose of the questioning was [to rescue a possible 
victim]"). 
Conversely, courts will not allow the exception when an officer asks questions seeking to 
elicit general information, presumably because these questions reveal a desire solely for in-
criminatory evidence. See, e.g., Fleming v. Collins, 917 F.2d 850, 854 (Sth Cit. 1990) {allowing 
a question regarding who shot the defendant, but not other questions, including whether he 
had a gun, when the officer had absolutely no reason to suspect that he did}, modified, 927 
F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1991); Eaton, 676 F. Supp. at 366 (not allowing a question regarding why 
the defendant was in the area); State v. Hazley, 428 N.W2d 406, 411 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(not allowing questioning of with whom the defendant was); In re John C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 223, 
228 (App. Div. 1987) (not applying the exception when the officer's first question was "a 
request for an incriminating statement"). 
Furthermore, many courts interpret narrow questioning to be directly indicative of the 
officer's concern or motivation. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Garcia, 808 F. Supp. 784, 788 
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding "limited questioning" to be "for the purpose of protecting the of-
ficers' safety"); State v. Ramirez, 871P.2d237, 245 (Ariz. 1994) (determining that the proper 
approach is to look at the "nature and context of the questions" in order to see if they "were 
motivated by public safety concerns"); Orso, 789 S.W.2d at 185 (determining from questions 
that were "brief and limited in scope" that the officer's "main concern" was safety); State v. 
Jackson, 756 S.W.2d 620, 621-22 (Mo. Ct App. 1988) (finding the question "Where's the 
gun?" indicative that officer "was merely trying to detennine whether the suspect was un-
armed"); State v. Turner, 716 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. Ct App. 1986) (finding that a "brief 
question, limited in scope" indicated a "purpose of neutralizing a potentially dangerous situa-
tion"); State v. Lopez, 652 A.2d 696, 699 (N.H. 1994) (finding that officer's restraint from 
asking incriminatory questions indicates that he did not have an improper motivation). 
Even certain courts that purport to apply an objective test recognize that focusing ques-
tions on an emergency indicates the officer's concern for safety. See, e.g., United States v. 
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The content of the questions is particularly illuminating because 
of their innate expressive quality. The officer's questions are akin 
to windows into his thought process. The officer will ask questions 
about what directly concerns him. Questions limited to the per-
ceived emergency have a sense of urgency that is absent in more 
general questions.s2 
B. Timing of the Questioning 
The timing of the officer's questions is an important indicator of 
whether he actually believed in an imminent threat to public safety. 
If an officer truly believes in the presence of an emergency, he will 
immediately ask questions necessary to defuse the situation.s3 The 
officer's knQwledge of the danger coupled with the immediacy of 
the question verifies a legitimate noninvestigatory purpose. Con-
versely, an appreciable delay before questioning about the alleged 
danger indicates that investigatory considerations, rather than an 
immediate danger, motivated the officer. There is a general as-
sumption that if a matter is important, it would be mentioned or 
dealt with earlier rather than later.54 Several aspects of Quarles 
support this requirement of immediate questioning.ss Furthermore, 
courts widely consider an officer's immediate questioning as an ob-
jective factor that supports applying the Quarles exception.s6 
Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the "narrowly tailored question" was 
"deliberate" and an "attempt ••• to insure [the officer's] personal safety"). 
52. See Corr, supra note 49, at 739 (noting that questions not limited to the emergency 
"do not have [a] sense of urgency"). 
53. The officer may have other important safety concerns that prevent him from asking 
the question immediately. In Quarles, for instance, the officer first had to handcuff the sus-
pect before questioning him. 467 U.S. at 652. The officer should interrogate the suspect 
regarding the emergency as soon as reasonably possible. 
Admittedly, it is possible that an officer may be concerned about an emergency and none-
theless determine that asking questions immediately would be counterproductive. For exam-
ple, this may be the case with a mentally ill suspect who would be frightened by immediate 
interrogation. But these situations are rare, and the court applying the exception may con-
sider them when evaluating whether actual concern for safety motivated the arresting officer. 
The court may inquire, for example, whether the officer had reason to know about any exten-
uating circumstances and whether his questioning reflected those circumstances. 
54. Similar reasoning justifies the trial technique of impeachment by omission. When-
ever a police officer testifies about an important fact that he failed to include in a report 
made shortly after the incident, opposing counsel may impeach him regarding the fact's omis-
sion from the report. See THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 252 
(3d ed. 1992) ("The purpose is obvious: If what he is saying now was so significant, why 
didn't he put it in his report?"). Similarly, if a police officer asserts that a situation was 
urgent, a judge may justifiably ask: "Well then why didn't you ask about it immediately?" 
55. The Court created the exception generally for situations where an "exigency re-
quir[ es] immediate action by the officers." 467 U.S. at 659 n.8 (emphasis added). The "ac-
tion" authorized by the Court is "question[ing] reasonably prompted by a concern for the 
public safety." 467 U.S. at 656. Therefore, the very situation that activates the exception -
exigency - requires immediate action - questioning - regarding it. 
56. The courts are more likely to permit questions that an officer immediately asks when 
confronted with an emergency because it indicates an urgency of purpose to defuse an emer-
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Requiring officers to question suspects immediately regarding 
public safety concerns preserves Miranda's clear set of guidelines 
and rules for police to follow. When a suspect is in custody, officers 
know that they have to give certain warnings before questioning 
him. The requirement that officers automatically deliver these 
warnings is one of Miranda's strengths. In order to preserve this 
clarity best - and still have a public safety exception - the officer 
should now only have two choices as soon as a suspect is in custody: 
give the Miranda warnings, or immediately act to remedy a per-
ceived public safety emergency.57 That is, if a police officer believes 
a threat is serious and imminent enough to warrant suspension of 
gency. See, e.g., United States v. Brotzman, No. 93-50839, 1994 WL 721798, at *2 {9th Cir. 
Dec. 28, 1994) (finding a concern for safety by federal agents when questioning about weap-
ons occurred "within the first few minutes of the agents' entry into [the suspect's] home"); 
United States v. Knox, 950 F.2d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 1991) {finding a question admissible be-
cause it was an "immediate attempt to locate the gun to eliminate ..• danger"); People v. 
Cole, 211 Cal. Rptr. 242, 248-49 (0. App. 1985) (permitting a question about a missing 
weapon asked right after patdown); State v. Lopez, 652 A.2d 696, 698-99 {N.H. 1994) (al-
lowing question about a weapon that the officer asked as soon as he noticed the suspect's 
empty shoulder holster); People v. Ratliff, 584 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 1992) {allowing 
a question posed immediately to help the police understand a chaotic situation); People v. 
Ingram, 576 N.Y.S.2d 352, 352 {App. Div. 1991) (permitting a question intended to locate a 
missing gun asked immediately after patdown search); People v. Hawthorne, 553 N.Y.S.2d 
799, 800 (App. Div. 1990) (permitting exception when officer "immediately asked 'where is 
the gun?' "). 
When an officer delays his questioning, or prolongs it considerably, a court may fail to see 
such an urgent motivation and consequently refuse the exception. See, e.g., United States v. 
Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 693 (4th Cir.1994) (refusing question asked while suspect was being led 
away), cert. denied, 115 S. a. 2005 (1995); In re John C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 223, 228 (App. Div. 
1987) (not finding sufficient an "immediate inquiry" when the officer's first question was 
purely "incriminatory" and the questioning was "intermittent[] for close to one hour"); State 
v. Stevenson, 784 S.W.2d 143, 144 {Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to allow the exception when 
the officer delayed in inquiring about the gun's whereabouts because he did not consider the 
defendant an immediate threat); cf. Brutzman, 1994 WL 721798, at *l, *2 (noting the differ-
ence in purpose between questions asked "within the first few minutes" or arriving on the 
scene and those asked in "a three-hour long interview ... in a private office"). 
Courts often find that the purpose behind an officer's questioning is legitimate particu-
larly when he asks questions immediately after learning of a danger, even if the suspect has 
already been in custody for a long time before the questioning. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lawrence, 952 F.2d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (permitting officer's question about the loca-
tion of the gun asked as soon as the officer became aware that the defendant had been 
carrying one); State v. Ramirez, 871P.2d237, 244-45 (Ariz. 1994) (allowing questions asked 
immediately upon learning of a possible at-large suspect). 
Moreover, some courts expressly make the connection between an officer's immediate 
questioning and his genuine concern for safety. See, e.g., State v. Orso, 789 S.W.2d 177, 185 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (determining the officer's "main concern," in part, from the fact that the 
questioning was "immediately following the discovery of [a] body"); State v. Jackson, 756 
S.W.2d 620, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (determining what the officer "wanted to" do from his 
immediate questioning when unable to locate the weapon). Occasionally, even a court that 
refuses to consider the subjective motivation of an officer will admit that immediate ques-
tioning indicates a genuine concern. See United States v. Colon Osorio, 877 F. Supp. 771, 776 
n.2 (D.P.R. 1994) ("We are certain that the interrogating agent's motivation was honest. In 
the heat of the moment, and in a split second, the question was uttered •••• "). 
57. Cf. Corr, supra note 49, at 739 ("Law enforcement agencies with a policy of always 
providing Miranda warnings to suspects immediately at the time of arrest may find this policy 
especially counterproductive in situations where the public safety exception would apply."). 
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the suspect's Miranda rights, he should - and must - ask about it 
at once.ss 
C. Timing of Miranda Warnings 
The timing of the Miranda warnings may be persuasive evidence 
of the arresting officer's motivation. In general, Miranda requires 
the police to advise a suspect in custody of his rights before ques-
tioning him.59 Although the police may legally warn the suspect at 
any time before interrogation, an officer's purpose to resolve an 
emergency is more evident if he gives Miranda warnings either im-
mediately after asking questions related to the emergency or imme-
diately before asking purely investigatory questions.6° This 
immediate warning reveals the officer's genuine concern for public 
safety because it shows that the officer did not simply disregard the 
suspect's right to Miranda warnings, but rather, truly believed that 
an exigent situation justified their temporary suspension. 61 Con-
versely, giving the Miranda warnings immediately before investiga-
tory questions - and after questions properly limited to an 
emergency - reveals that the officer has instinctively distinguished 
the two types of questions. ~e Court in Quarles recognized Of-
58. See United States v. Veilleux, 846 F. Supp. 149, 154 n.5 (D.N.H. 1994) (interpreting 
Quarles to contemplate a "spontaneous failure to warn prompted by an immediate concern 
for public safety"). 
59. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). At least one influential commentator 
has suggested a more lenient standard: 
Aren't you a little surprised that cops still have to read that whole "You have the right to 
remain silent" speech to every criminal they arrest? I mean is there anybody who 
doesn't know that by now? Can't they just go, "Freeze, you're under arrest. You ever 
seen Baretta?" 
"Yeah." 
"Good, get in the car." 
JERRY SEINFELD, SEINLANGUAGE 91-92 (1993). 
60. An arresting officer violates Miranda by continuing to question a suspect after he has 
exercised his right to remain silent. If the officer has already given a suspect the warnings, 
the court should only apply the exception and permit the answers under certain narrow cir-
cumstances. First, some new information must become available to the officer that would 
reasonably make him aware of an emergency. This requirement ensures that the officer had 
an objective reason to believe in an emergency. Second, the officer must ask questions lim-
ited to that emergency, immediately upon receiving that information. This requirement dem-
onstrates that the officer actually believed that an emergency existed. See supra section II.A-
B. 
Courts generally find the officer's appropriate motivation to be dispositive in these situa-
tions. See, e.g., United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying excep-
tion after warnings when officer asked about the possibility of a weapon "only in response to 
[the defendant's] request to enter the bedroom" to change clothes); State v. Meola, 488 So.2d 
645, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing exception when officer asked question after 
Miranda warnings and no new information had emerged). 
61. See, e.g., Meola, 488 So.2d at 646 (noting that the officer "had already given [the 
suspect] his Miranda rights, thus negating any argument that an emergency existed to justify 
the question"). Admittedly, advising a suspect of his rights after asking certain questions 
does not, and should not, instantly make those questions acceptable. Such behavior, how-
ever, strongly indicates a legitimate, rather than delinquent, purpose. 
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ficer Kraft's proper motivation in giving the warnings both directly 
after securing the emergency62 and directly before investigatory 
questioning.63 In addition, when applying the exception, lower 
courts frequently consider the timing of the Miranda warnings to be 
a dispositive factor in evaluating an officer's motivation.64 
Failure to warn instantly after the danger is secured may be con-
sistent with permissible police practice and a court should not re-
fuse the Quarles exception because of it.65 Miranda requires 
62. The majority in Quarles cited Officer Kraft's questioning process as an appropriate 
instinctive application of the exception. They praised him for "advising [Quarles] of his 
rights" directly after asking the question necessary to secure the emergency. New York v. 
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 {1984). 
Later in the same Term, the Court underscored the importance of promptly advising the 
suspect of his rights after taking care of an emergenCy: "Once [information necessary to 
neutralize the threat to the public] has been obtained, the suspect must be given the [Mi· 
randa] warnings." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 429 n.10 {1984). The Court suggested 
this sequence as a way of emphasizing the narrowness of the Quarles exception. 
63. While praising Officer Kraft's instincts, the majority in Quarles also noted with ap-
proval the fact that he gave the warnings directly before asking "investigatory questions." 467 
U.S. at 659. Furthermore, the dissent by Justice Marshall appears to interpret the majority as 
calling for warnings given before investigatory questions, rather than after emergency-based 
questions. 467 U.S. at 680 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
64. Courts have consistently permitted the exception when an officer promptly advises a 
suspect of his rights after securing the danger. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 646 So. 2d 704, 708 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1994) {allowing the exception when officer read the subject his Miranda 
rights immediately after finding the location of the shooter); Smith v. State, 452 S.E.2d 494, 
496 (Ga. 1995) (permitting the exception when the officer began preparing Miranda rights 
forms right after learning the gun's location); State v. Jackson, 756 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1988) (permitting the exception when officers advised defendant of his rights immedi-
ately after securing the gun); State v. Trangucci, 796 P.2d 606, 608 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) 
(allowing the exception when the officer gave Miranda warnings immediately after the officer 
asked about the location of the gun); Bryant v. State, 816 S.W .2d 554, 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1991) (permitting the exception when the officer advised defendant of his rights immediately 
after determining there was no further danger). 
Some courts explicitly state that the public safety exception should apply when an officer 
promptly gives the warnings after defusing the emergency because such· prompt warnings 
indicate the officer had an appropriate purpose. See, e.g., State v. Orso, 789S.W.2d177, 185 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that Quarles applied "because Miranda warnings were timely" 
after defendant had volunteered information); State v. Turner, 716 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1986) (finding that the officer's "primary concern" was for safety when he "discontin-
ued his interrogation and shortly thereafter informed defendant of his Miranda rights" after 
determining the gun was in a secure place). 
Conversely, many courts will not allow the exception when a delay between the officer's 
questions and the Miranda warnings indicates mere delinquence by the officer and no belief 
in an emergency. See, e.g., People v. Strickland, 570 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (App. Div. 1991) 
(refusing the exception when it was "undisputed that Miranda warnings were not adminis-
tered to defendant until his arraignment"); In re John C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 223, 228 (App. Div. 
1987) (not allowing the exception when the suspect was first given his Miranda warnings at 
the police precinct an hour after any danger had passed); State v. Stevenson, 784 S.W.2d 143, 
145 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing the exception when officers had not given the defendant 
his warnings although he had been identified as the shooter and the weapon had been found 
long before). 
65. Although an officer in a non-emergency setting would not have to give Miranda 
warnings until before investigatory interrogation, there is a colorable argument that an of-
ficer in an emergency situation should give the warnings immediately after securing the dan-
ger. The questions an officer asks to secure public safety may have an incriminatory quality 
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warnings before interrogation rather than after custody. 66 In other 
words, an officer is not delinquent if he administers the warnings 
before investigatory questioning, even if the suspect has been in 
~ustody for a long time before receiving warnings. 67 In addition, a 
court may justifiably find that coneern for safety motivated an of-
ficer from the mere fact that he administered the warnings before 
asking purely investigatory questions, no matter when.68 
D. Testimony 
For lack of a better method, many courts determine the officer's 
intent from his direct testimony,69 but this process is not sufficiently 
accurate to be the sole method of determining intent. Officers' tes-
timony may be self-serving;7o they may either lie about, or perhaps 
in hindsight misinterpret, what their intent was at the time of the 
arrest.71 This section argues that courts should look to an· officer's 
even if they are legitimately prompted by concern for safety. After answering these ques-
tions, a suspect may be more likely to blurt out additional incriminating information volunta· 
rily, under the assumption that he has already incriminated himself. In order to protect 
against this self-incrimination, it would be best to require warnings immediately after the 
emergency-prompted questioning. 
66. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 {1966). 
67. Although Miranda does not require automatically warning a suspect upon talcing him 
into custody, it is standard practice for many law enforcement agencies. See Corr, supra note 
49, at 739. More importantly, it is a desirable practice in that it affords greater protection to 
individual constitutional rights. If a court wanted to encourage this practice it could refuse 
the Quarles exception unless warnings were given immediately thereafter. See note 57 and 
accompanying text. 
68. See United States v. Lawrence, 952 F.2d 1034, 1036 {8th Cir. 1992) {finding that the 
officer had a "reasonable concern" for safety when he gave the warnings before conducting 
his investigation, but well after securing the emergency). The Quarles Court also may have 
made this connection. See supra note 63 and aecompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 697 {4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 2005 {1995) (Harvey, J., concurring) {finding that the officer's testimony regarding her 
subjective fear was sufficient to support the exception); United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 
1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (allowing the Quarles exception after the officer testified that 
before he searches alleged drug dealers he asks them whether they have needles on them 
because he was once stuck by a needle); Fleming v. Collins, 917 F.2d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1990), 
modified, 921 F.2d 824 {5th Cir. 1991) (using an officer's testimony as evidence that question· 
ing was "consistent with the Quarles exception"); Smith v. State, 646 So. 2d 704, 707-08 {Ala. 
Crim. App. 1994) (applying the exception when the officer testified about his "main con· 
cern"); State v. Vickers, 768 P.2d 1177, 1184 (Ariz. 1989) {allowing the exception when the 
officer testified that he asked a question in order to determine how to save inmates' lives), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1011 (1992); People v. Gilliard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(noting the officer's testimony that he asked defendant where the gun was to remove it from 
a place a child could find it); Hill v. State, 598 A.2d 784, 785 {Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) 
(allowing the exception when the officer testified that he was "concerned about the immedi· 
ate safety of all parties"); Bryant v. State, 816 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) {finding 
the testimony of the officer that he was "unsure" who shot the victim to be evidence of a 
concern for public safety); Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 1992) {finding the officer's 
testimony that she asked question "for officer safety" to be evidence of questioning within 
the Quarles exception). 
70. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text 
71. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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testimony only if he testifies that a concern for public safety did not 
motivate him. 
Lower courts should treat an officer's testimony like a one-way 
ratchet.12 If an officer testifies that his motivation was not to pro-
tect the public safety, courts should consider the testimony as a con-
clusive reason not to apply the exception. The testimony has an 
inherent trustworthiness because it goes against the state's - and 
likely the officer's - interest.73 As a rule, courts applying Quarles 
already follow this guideline closely.74 On the other hand, if an of-
ficer testifies that he was properly motivated, the court may feel 
free to disregard the testimony; there is a regrettable - but inher-
ent - lack of trustworthiness accompanying such an assertion.7s 
The court may use the testimony to corroborate other objective fac-
tors indicating a subjective concern for safety,76 but it should not 
use the testimony to replace these factors. 
ill. OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS OF THE 
OFFICER'S MoTIV ATION 
After initially ascertaining that a genuine concern for public 
safety motivated the arresting officer's questions, a court applying 
the Quarles exception must ensure that this concern was reason-
able. The Quarles majority explicitly requires that the officer's be-
lief be reasonable.77 The applying court must determine whether a 
72. A one-way ratchet is "a bar or wheel with teeth that are engaged by a pawl, usually to 
prevent reversal of motion." THE RANDOM HousE D1cnoNARY 740 (1978). For example, a 
socket wrench that will tum a bolt clockwise but not counterclockwise operates as a one-way 
ratchet. 
73. Cf. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3) (allowing an exception to the hearsay rules when an 
unavailable declarant made a statement against interest). 
74. See, e.g., State v. Meola, 488 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that an 
officer asking a defendant if he had a gun in his car was not within the exception because of 
testimony that the officer already knew the defendant had a gun there and the police were 
going to impound the car anyway); In re John C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 223, 228 (App. Div. 1987) (not 
allowing the exception when "the officer himself" testified that his questions were part of his 
"investigation" rather than "out of any safety concerns"); State v. Stevenson, 784 S.W .2d 143, 
144-45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (not allowing exception when officer testified that he did not 
consider the defendant to be an "immediate threat"). 
75. See Joe Sexton, Types of Perjury Common Among Police Officers Are Detailed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1994, at 27 (discussing a New York mayoral panel that "identified perjury as 
'perhaps the most widespread form of police wrongdoing facing today's criminal justice 
system'"). 
76. See United States v. Brotzman, No. 93-50839, 1994 WL 721798, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 
28, 1994) (examining testimony for consistency regarding "purpose" and other matters). 
77. The first time the Court fully described a situation where the exception applies -
other than to describe it simply as "kaleidoscopic" - the Court said it should be "a situation 
in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public 
safety." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (emphasis added). In addition, the 
Court distinguished Quarles from the somewhat similar factual circumstances of Orozco v. 
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), by noting that the officers' need to protect the public ought to be 
"objectively reasonable" under the public safety exception. 467 U.S. at 659 n.8. 
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reasonable police officer under the circumstances would have 
thought that an immediate and substantial danger existed. Lower 
courts should insist that two factors are present: an imminent per-
ceived threat and a substantial perceived threat. Quarles specifi-
cally contemplates these factors.1s 
Courts are most likely to consider the officer's actual motivation 
to be the determinative factor in applying the Quarles exception.79 
With very few exceptions, an officer's actual belief in an emergency 
- as manifested by the factors outlined in Part II -will be objec-
tively reasonable.so The "objectively reasonable" requirement is 
necessary only to protect against the possibility that a particular of-
ficer's subjective reading of a situation will not be reasonable. 
This Part presents the mechanics of the objective reasonable-
ness prong of this Note's test. Section ill.A first presents factors 
that a court should.look for when determining whether the situation 
presented an imminent danger. Section III.B then presents the fac-
tors that a court should look for when determining whether the 
danger was substantial enough to permit the exception. 
78. First, the Court used the Quarles facts as a model of reasonable behavior and high-
lighted how important the imminency of the danger was by stating that the officers "were 
confronted with the immediate necessity" of finding the gun. 467 U.S. at 657 (emphasis ad-
ded). Second, the Court wanted to protect officers in a chaotic situation from having to 
conduct a balancing of social costs. See supra section I.B.1. The phrases the Court used to 
describe the time frame of such a chaotic situations - "a matter of seconds," "only limited 
time" - indicate that the Court envisioned imminency as a necessary feature of a reasonable 
danger. 467 U.S. at 657, 658. Fmally, when distinguishing Orozco, the Court emphasized 
imminency in its restatement of what constituted an "objectively reasonable need" to protect 
the public: "[an] exigency requiring immediate action." 467 U.S. at 659 n.8; see also Lewis, 
supra note 12, at 18, 20 ("The 'public safety exception' applies whenever an officer has the 
need to inquire about an immediate and perceived threat to the public ••.• "). 
The substantiality requirement, perhaps because it is somewhat intuitive, is more difficult 
to find in the opinion. Nevertheless, the opinion reveals that the Court was only willing to 
suspend the Miranda safeguards when there was a true, substantial danger to public safety. 
The Court noted that "the cost to society in terms of fewer convictions of guilty suspects" is 
inadequate to justify suspending Miranda warnings. 467 U.S. at 656-57. The Court main-
tained that the cost must be "more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in con-
victing [a suspect]." 467 U.S. at 657. In other words, there must be a reasonably substantial 
threat apart from the speculative possibility that a dangerous felon will escape justice. 
79. See Pizzi, supra note 14, at 584 (noting that "when lower courts decide which cases 
fall within the public safety exception ..• what the officer was trying to do usually will be the 
determining factor.") (footnote omitted). 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 697 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 2005 (1995) (Harvey, J., concurring) (finding that the officer's concern for safety and 
"desire to protect other agents ••• support the district court's determination that an objec-
tively reasonable need existed here to protect the police and the public from danger"); State 
v. Lopez, 652 A.2d 696, 699 (N.H. 1994) (finding an emergency to be "objectively clear" 
when the officer "reasonably believed" that the suspect was armed and dangerous). Almost 
none of the courts that find - either directly or indirectly - that an emergency actually 
motivated the officer find that his concern was unreasonable. But see United States v. Colon 
Osorio, 877 F. Supp. 771, 776 (D.P.R. 1994) ("Although the agent's motivation was honest, 
the fact remains that Colon-Osorio had been handcuffed and safely arrested. The gun had 
been seized by the FBI agents and the arrest scene was under the agents' control."). 
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A. Imminence of the Danger 
When gauging the imminence of a danger to public safety, 
courts should consider the entire situation as perceived by the ar-
resting officer. For example, a court may consider the nature of the 
locale or the number of people present. A chaotic crowd of people 
in a public place often creates an imminent fear for the public's 
safety because of the danger that a person may at any moment find 
a missing weapon. 81 When a crowd is disorderly and confusion is 
rampant, a court is most likely to find the danger was imminent.82 
Courts do not absolutely require, however, that the locale be public 
and crowded.83 A well-traveled area84 or a private home with chil-
dren present85 may qualify as imminently dangerous situations. In 
any case, courts should be more reluctant to find that danger to 
public safety was objectively imminent on private property or in a 
desolate area, or if other circumstances so indicate.86 
B. Substantiality of the Danger 
A court should also examine the circumstances from the of-
ficer's perspective when measuring the substantiality of a public 
safety danger. The court should look to objective factors to deter-
mine whether the officer should have suspected or reasonably been 
aware of the presence of these safety risks. The most important 
factors that courts should consider are weapons and accomplices. 
Lower courts tend to allow questions about the whereabouts of ac-
complices87 or guns88 if the officer knows that they exist, or about 
81. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884, 888 (9th Cir.1987) (describing a crowd 
gathering in a rough neighborhood at nightfall). 
82. See, e.g., People v. Ratliff, 584 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 1992) (robbers posing as 
victims in a crowd running out of a nightclub). 
83. See, e.g., In re John C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 223, 227 (App. Div. 1987) ("Although the 
Quarles case dealt with a large public area, we do not perceive that the Supreme Court 
intended its reasoning to apply only to such locations."). 
84. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Zavaris, No. 93-1358, 1994 WL 532739, at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 29, 
1994) (applying the exception where the suspect was arrested and questioned on an interstate 
highway). 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Antwine, 873 F.2d 1144, 1147 (8th Cir. 1989); cf. In re John 
C., 519 N.Y.S.2d at 227 (refusing the exception even though there was a missing gun in a 
house full of kids because the officers' behavior indicated no belief in an emergency). 
86. See, e.g., People v. Strickland, 570 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (App. Div. 1991) (declining to 
find a threat to public safety in a "rural residential area"); Ohio v. Koren, No. 93-L-092, 1994 
WL 738804, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1994) (same for a "private residence"); State v. 
Stevenson, 784 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (same). 
87. See, e.g., People v. Ratliff, 584 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 1992) (allowing police 
officer inquiry as to the whereabouts one of several fleeing robbers). 
88. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 515 So.2d 86, 91 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (allowing officer 
to inquire as to the whereabouts of a gun once the suspect told him that he had killed two 
people). 
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the existence of accomplicess9 or guns9o if the officer reasonably sus-
pects that they may exist. In addition, courts have often found that 
the possibility of harm to a specified individual - for example, a 
kidnapped child91 or the police officer himself - is a reasonably 
substantial danger as well. In such situations, although an officer 
may not know the potential means of harm, the potential victim is 
apparent. 
IV. ADVANTAGES OF THIS NOTE'S PROPOSED TEST FOR 
APPLYING QUARLES 
In order to remedy the confusion among lower courts over how 
to apply the Quarles exception, this Note proposes a two-prong test. 
Courts should require that the arresting officer actually be con-
cerned with an emergency, and ensure that the concern was reason-
able. In addition, this Note argues Quarles itself supports such an 
approach. This Part argues that this proposed two-prong approach 
is superior to other possible methods. First, section IV.A maintains 
that the widespread subjective analysis by lower courts applying 
Quarles indicates that such an analysis is appropriate. Section IV.B 
then states the policy considerations that support a requirement 
that the officer's actual concern also be reasonable. 
A. The Reasonableness of an Analysis of Subjective Motivation 
Suggesting that Quarles calls for analysis of the arresting of-
ficer's subjective motivation is controversial. Virtually all of the 
commentators and courts who specifically comment on· the matter 
agree that a court should ignore the officer's motives when applying 
the Quarles exception.92 Nonetheless, this Note has argued that 
Quarles actually endorses an inquiry into subjective motivation. 
Section IV.A.1 asserts that lower courts - who must apply the 
Quarles exception frequently and consistently - in fact do consider 
the arresting officer's intents and motives. Section IV.A.2 then ar-
gues that policy considerations make such an approach desirable. 
89. See, e.g., Fleming v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that police 
officer reasonably speculated that there may have been more people involved), modified, 927 
F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1991). 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Eaton, 676 F. Supp. 362, 365 (D. Me. 1988) (stating that 
officer "knew that the Defendant had a gun pennit and that he was therefore likely to have a 
gun in his possession"). 
91. See, e.g., People v. Laliberte, 615 N.E.2d 813, 819-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
92. See supra note 13; see also infra notes %-105 and accompanying text. 
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1. How Lower Courts Have Investigated Subjective Intent When 
Applying Quarles 
Although lower courts apply the public safety exception in a va-
riety of ways, the vast majority of these courts investigate the ar-
resting officer's subjective intent. The actual behavior of the lower 
courts therefore supports this Note's use of a test that examines 
subjective motivation in applying the exception. Despite the wide-
spread misperception by commentators that Quarles prohibits in-
quiry into an officer's subjective motivation,93 in practice most 
lower courts take into account an officer's subjective beliefs and 
purposes when applying the public safety exception. Since these 
courts are the ones who must regularly implement the public safety 
exception, their investigation into subjective motivation demon-
strates the superior utility of such an approach. 
Many courts openly inquire into the subjective motivation of the 
arresting officer without stating whether this method is endorsed by 
the Quarles opinion or not. In other words, these courts make a 
subjective determination about what the officer was actually trying 
to do.94 These courts investigate subjective motivation using a vari-
ety of different terms,9s but the implicit assumption is that they be-
93. See supra note 13; see also infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text. 
94. See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 693 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 2005 (1995) (noting that the Quarles exception should not be applied if officers are simply 
"on a fishing expedition" or are otherwise attempting to avoid the strictures of Miranda); 
Mobley, 40 F.3d at 697 (Harvey, J., concurring) (finding that the officer acted out of concern 
for her own safety); Fleming v. Collins, 917 F.2d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1990) (permitting question 
by officer who testified about the purpose behind the question), modified, 921 F.2d 824 (5th 
Cir. 1991); State v. Vickers, 768 P.2d 1177, 1184 (Ariz. 1989), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1011 
(1992) (examining the officer's motivation in asking the question); Bryant v. State, 816 
S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (making a finding as to what the officer was trying to 
do). 
95. Several of these courts look for the presence of an actual "concern" for safety, or a 
"belief" in an emergency. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 952 F.2d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 
1992) (finding it dispositive that the officer "had a reasonable concern that" a gun may be 
found by a child); United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1989) (disallowing 
question as to location of gun when officers "believed the gun to be" in a truck in police 
custody); United States v. Alfonso, No. 94 CR813(HB), 1995 WL 6225, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
9, 1995) (finding that the presence of a great deal of cocaine justified a "valid safety concern" 
regarding the presence of others in the apartment); United States v. Dodge, 852 F. Supp. 139, 
142 (D. Conn. 1994) ("The Quarles exception looks to the arresting officer's belief .... "); 
People v. Gilliard, 234 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (Ct. App. 1987) (determining that the test in 
Quarles was that "the officers reasonably believed" in a danger); Smith v. State, 452 S.E.2d 
494, 496 (Ga. 1995) (allowing the exception when the trial court found that questioning "was 
asked out of concern for ... safety"); Price v. State, 591N.E.2d1027, 1030 (Ind. 1992) (find-
ing that the police had an "immediate concern for the safety of the general public"); Hill v. 
State, 598 A.2d 784, 786-87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (applying exception when officers 
"reasonably believed" in emergency); State v. Orso, 789 S.W.2d 177, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) 
("[T]he officers['] main concern was to locate [the victim]."); State v. Koren, No. 93-L-092, 
1994 WL 738804 at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1994) (finding no evidence of a "concern for 
public safety"); State v. Stevenson 784 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) ("[I]t is clear he 
was not concerned for his own safety."). Others look into the arresting officer's "motiva-
tion," see, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 871P.2d237, 245 (Ariz.1994) (allowing inquiry "motivated 
•. 
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lieve that the Quarles opinion endorses their analysis or else they 
would not apply the exception in this manner. 
Several courts, on the other hand, claim to rely solely on an ob-
jective inquiry and disclaim any inquiry into the arresting officer's 
subjective motivation. Nonetheless, these courts covertly consider 
- and find dispositive - the officer's subjective motivation.96 
These courts may look to the officer's "purpose";97 note that the 
officers "believed" in an emergency;9s determine what "prompted" 
or "motivated" the officer's actions;99 speculate as to the arresting 
officer's "desire" to control an emergency;100 note that the officer's 
by a need to protect ... safety"), or his "reason," see, e.g., State v. Trangucci, 796 P.2d 606, 
608 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting Quarles as requiring inquiry into the "reason for the 
questioning"), or "purpose" in questioning the suspect, see, e.g., United States v. Antwine, 
873 F.2d 1144, 1147 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding dispositive that the lower court held that the 
officer's "sole purpose" was to defuse an emergency); United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 
392 n.14 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the negotiators' "primary purpose" was preserving the 
defendant's safety); Smith v. State, 646 So. 2d 704, 708 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that 
the officer's question "was asked solely for the purpose of determining whether the [individ-
ual] was injured"); People v. Melvin, 591 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (App. Div. 1992) (noting that 
question was "more for the purpose" of securing a danger than for incriminatory purposes). 
Regardless of the term used, courts often find the presence of an actual belief, concern or 
motivation to be dispositive in applying the exception. See, e.g., Lawrence, 952 F.2d at 1036 
(finding dispositive that the officer "had a reasonable concern that" a gun may be found by a 
child); Raborn, 872 F.2d at 595 (not permitting question as to location of a gun when officers 
"believed the gun to be" in a truck in police custody); United States v. Diaz-Garcia, 808 F. 
Supp. 784, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding dispositive that the questioning "was for the purpose 
of protecting the officers' safety"); Koren, 1994 WL 738804, at *2 (refusing the exception 
when there was no evidence of "concern for public safety"); Bryant, 816 S.W.2d at 557 (find-
ing what the officer was trying to do determinative). More frequently, however, a lower 
court will interpret Quarles as requiring subjective inquiry but that analysis is not a factor in 
the court's holding. See, e.g., Antwine, 873 F.2d at 1147 (interpreting Quarles as applying 
when questions are "justified by an officer's legitimate concern for someone's safety"); Webb, 
755 F.2d at 392 n.14 (not relying upon Quarles but finding that it would apply because the 
defendant's safety was "of primary concern to the negotiators, and the negotiators primary 
purpose" was preserving his safety); Trangucci, 796 P.2d at 608 (interpreting Quarles as re-
quiring a proper "reason for the questioning"). 
96. The apparently inconsistent practice of these courts demonstrates that a subjective 
inquiry is inherently easy to conduct and a natural element in applying the exception. See 
infra note 106 and accompanying text 
'17. See, e.g., People v. Howard, 556 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942 (App. Div. 1990} (noting that the 
officer's question was " 'more for the purpose of clarifying the situation' " than for securing 
evidence of a crime) (quoting In re John C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 223, 228 (App. Div. 1987)). 
98. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 652 A.2d 696, 699 (N.H. 1994) ("[The officer] reasonably 
believed that [the suspect] had just committed two ruthless assaults."). 
99. See, e.g., United States v. Brotzman, No. 93-50839, 1994 WL 721798, at *2 (9th Cir. 
Dec. 28, 1994) (holding that the exception applies "[w]hen an officer's questions result from 
(safety concern] motivations" and finding that the instant officers asked questions "out of an 
objectively reasonable concern for ••. safety"); United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688, 693 
(4th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply the exception when no public safety emergency "motivated 
the questioning"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2005 (1995); People v. Strickland, 570 N.Y.S.2d 712, 
715 (App. Div. 1991) ("[The officers'] questioning was prompted in our view by [an incrimi-
natory] desire •.•• "). 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1987); Strickland, 570 
N.Y.S.2d at 715 (refusing to apply the exception because of a solely incriminatory "desire"), 
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proper actions were "deliberate";101 or even explicitly arrive ·at 
their decisions from a "subjective standpoint."102 Courts of this 
type may find the officer's subjective motivation to be dispositive, 
or at the very least important.103 The fact that courts which dis-
claim a subjective approach end up speaking in subjective terms is 
further proof as to how natural and appropriate a subjective analy-
sis is. 
Another set of courts misinterprets Quarles as prohibiting sub-
jective inquiry and does not conduct covert inquiry into the officer's 
motivation, but these courts nevertheless place great weight on ob-
jective factors that reflect the officer's subjective intent. For exam-
ple, if the officer limits his questions to the perceived danger, asks 
them immediately upon recognizing the danger, and ceases pre-Mi-
randa questioning when the danger has dissipated - factors that 
Part II argues reflect a subjective belief in an emergency104 - these 
purportedly objective courts will find that Quarles applies.10s This 
tendency indicates that even when courts fail to use subjective 
terms in their analysis, the officer's actual subjective motivation will 
nonetheless persuade most courts. 
101. See, f.g., United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he officer's 
deliberate refusal to pursue the subject heightens our confidence that, in this case, the nar-
rowly tailored question was a reasonable attempt to insure [safety]."). 
102. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, ·864 F. Supp. 375, 382 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
103. See, e.g., Brutzman, 1994 WL 721798, at *2 (finding that the exception applied be-
cause the officers asked questions "out of an objectively reasonable concern for ... safety"); 
Brady, 819 F.2d at 888 (finding the fact that the officer's questions "arose from his concern 
with public safety" to be dispositive); State v. Jackson, 756 S.W.2d 620, 621-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1988) {finding what the officer was "trying to" do to be dispositive); State v. Turner, 716 
S.W.2d 462, 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding determinative that the officer's "primary con-
cern .•. was to locate the gun and prevent additional deaths or injuries"); State v. Lopez, 652 
A.2d 696, 699 (N.H. 1994) (finding that the officer's "reasonabl[e] belie[f]" satisfied the re-
quirements of the exception); Strickland, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 715 (finding no "public safety cri-
sis" when the officer "was prompted" by an incriminatory "desire"). 
104. See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text. 
105. See, e.g., People v. Laliberte, 615 N.E2d 813, 821 (ill. App. Ct. 1993) (applying the 
exception when officer ceased questioning upon learning the location of the kidnapped baby 
and did not resume until after defendant gave a written waiver of his Miranda rights); State 
ex rel A.S., 548 A2d 202, 205-06 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (finding an objective 
"serious danger to the public" that was addressed by "limited questioning"); State v. Hoyer, 
506 N.E.2d 1190, 1192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (finding a danger when an officer asked where 
the gun was immediately upon finding bullets on the defendant). Laliberte is unique case 
because the court was simultaneously applying both the public safety exception and the "res-
cue doctrine." The court explicitly distinguished the two exceptions because the latter has a 
clear subjective element. 615 N.E.2d at 821. In any case, the court stated that these facts 
satisfied both exceptions. 615 N.E.2d at 821. 
Admittedly, an objective court may occasionally allow the exception even though these 
three factors indicate no actual belief on behalf of the officer. See, e.g., United States v. 
Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir. 1989). Conversely, a court may even refuse the excep-
tion despite an explicit admission that the officer's ''motivation was honest" based upon his 
immediate interrogation. See, e.g., United.States v. Colon Osorio, 877 F. Supp. 771, 776 n.2 
(D.P.R. 1994). 
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The fact that most courts applying Quarles investigate the of-
ficer's motivation is illuminating for several reasons. First, the fact 
that many courts apparently repudiate subjective inquiries but 
nonetheless conduct one indicates that this inquiry is natural, per-
haps even inevitable. Their inability to resist investigating the ar-
resting officer's motivation - and the fact that they do not even 
appear to notice their inconsistency - underscores the natural fit 
of such an investigation in applying this exception. Even among 
those who believed when Quarles was decided that the opinion for-
bids all subjective inquiry, there was some speculation that lower 
courts would nonetheless find the officer's motivation to be 
determinative.106 
Second, these are the courts that need to make sense of the pub-
lic safety exception and apply it on a regular basis. The fact that so 
many courts require evidence of an actual belief in a public safety 
emergency before they will apply the exception indicates that such 
a requirement makes sense. Lower courts - explicitly or other-
wise - reject the idea that they may apply the public safety excep-
tion without first finding that the officer actually believed in an 
emergency.107 
2. Policy Advantages of Inquiry Into Subjective Motivation 
This section argues that several policy considerations make ex-
amining an officer's subjective motivation desirable. First, a public 
safety exception based upon subjective concern is the easiest for 
police officers to administer. Second, a subjective test is effective in 
deterring police misconduct. Third, determining the officer's sub-
jective motivation is not a very difficult task. Finally, this section 
argues that the test proposed by this Note is a reliable indicator of 
an officer's actual subjective motivation. 
Requiring that an officer have an actual belief in a threat to 
public safety will limit the extent to which the public safety excep-
tion "blurs the edges of the clear line" established by Miranda. 108 
The reading of Miranda rights has become a standard arrest proce-
dure reflexively preformed by officers. In order to best preserve 
this instinctive application of Miranda, the officer must discard it 
only when he instinctively believes an e~ergency is present. The 
106. See Pizzi, supra note 14, at 583-84 ("One suspects that for all the talk in Quarles 
about the irrelevance of the motive of the police officer, when lower courts decide which 
cases fall within the public safety exception •.• what the officer was trying to do usually will 
be the determining factor."). 
107. Cf. id. at 583 ("To try to erect a public safety exception to Miranda that works inde-
pendently of a genuine concern for public safety on the part of the officer is awkward at 
best."). 
108. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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Quarles majority recognized the importance of an exception that is 
easy to apply for the arresting officer and, in doing so, implicitly 
endorsed a subjective inquiry by referring to the officer's "legiti-
mate instincts": "The exception which we recognize today, far from 
complicating the thought processes and the on-the-scene judgments 
of police officers, will simply free them to follow their legitimate in-
stincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the public 
safety."109 Officers can have confidence that their own reasonable 
belief in an emergency will be sufficient for the exception. That is, 
they are left with the simple choice of complying with Miranda's 
strictures or following their subjective instincts regarding the pres-
ence or absence of an emergency. 
Examining an arresting officer's intent will also best deter cer-
tain kinds of police misconduct. The Court has previously held that 
the "prime purpose [of the exclusionary rule] is to deter future un-
lawful police conduct. "110 Courts cannot deter unintended viola-
tions of Miranda; to the extent that courts can deter Miranda 
violations, they can only deter "consciously undertaken" viola-
tions.111 Although an officer's actual belief in an emergency may 
not prove there really is such an emergency, the absence of such a 
belief proves that an officer has consciously disregarded a suspect's 
Miranda rights. Limiting the Quarles exception to situations where 
the officer actually believes in an emergency will create disincen-
tives for police to consciously discard a suspect's Fifth Amendment 
rights. 
Although some commentators argue that a subjective test is too 
difficult and time-consuming, examining an officer's subjective mo-
tivation will not substantially increase the burden on courts any 
more than a purely objective test would. Opponents of a subjective 
test argue that a purely objective test is superior because it does not 
require courts to shine a light through the often murky waters of 
individual motivation.112 Their argument is that a purely objective 
test only adds one step to the Miranda inquiry. Miranda requires a 
court to determine first if there was custody and interrogation and 
then whether the officer properly warned the suspect of his Mi-
randa rights. A purely objective test for Quarles adds the addi-
109. 467 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added). For an analysis of the Court's discussion of "in-
stincts," see supra section I.B.2. 
110. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 {1974). 
111. Brewer v. Wiiliams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (asserting that 
an exception should exist to the Miranda rule when police act in good faith since no deter-
rence of illegal police conduct is accomplished by excluding relevant evidence); John M 
Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph_ of an Inconsistent 
Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 187-88 {1979). 
112. See Bode, supra note 13, at 204 (criticizing Quarles for "inject[ing] subjectivity into 
the already overburdened fact-finding process"). 
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tional inquiry of whether an objectively reasonable emergency 
justified the suspension of Miranda warnings. 
Although requiring a subjective belief in such an emergency 
could add one more step to a court's inquiry, this Note's test will 
usually require a court to perform only one step; a court need not 
inquire further if it finds an officer lacked an actual belief in a pub-
lic safety emergency. Alternatively, if a court does find that an of-
ficer actually believed in a public safety emergency, the inquiry into 
whether that belief was objectively reasonable will almost certainly 
not be extensive; the belief of an experienced officer in an emer-
gency is probative evidence that one existed,113 
Furthermore, the lack of trustworthiness frequently associated 
with subjective tests is not present in this Note's test. Courts often 
reject subjective tests because they typically rely on self-serving tes-
timony. For example, the Supreme Court has held that an objective 
test is the appropriate mechanism for deciding whether a suspect is 
"in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.114 The Court endorsed 
such an objective, reasonable-person test because, "unlike a subjec-
tive test, it 'is not solely dependent ... on the self-serving declara-
tions of the police officers .... ' "115 At the root of the disdain for 
subjective tests is the widespread concern that police officers, who 
are experienced at testifying in court proceedings, will simply give 
canned testimony attesting that they "honestly believed" in an 
emergency.116 
But an inquiry into subjective motivation does not have to rely 
upon unreliable testimony.117 Determining an officer's intent may 
seem like an unwieldy ordeal, but courts regularly look to a defend-
113. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
114. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 {1984). 
115. Bode, supra note 13, at 204 n.35 (quoting People v. P., 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (1967)). 
116. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
117. The Court in Quarles, for example, conducted its inquiry into Officer Kraft's subjec-
tive motivation without reference to his testimony. It noted that the New York Court of 
Appeals "declined to recognize an exigency exception to the usual requirements of Miranda 
because it found no indication from Officer Kraft's testimony at the suppression hearing that 
his subjective motivation in asking the question was to protect his own safety or the safety of 
the public." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984). This assessment of the lower 
holding is accurate in that the Court of Appeals did not make any finding regarding a public 
safety motivation, proper or improper. The Quarles Court did not, however, deny that an 
emergency motivated Officer Kraft; the Court's omission was solely because the prosecutor 
did not advance an exigency-exception theory. People v. Quarles, 444 N.E.2d 984, 985 (N.Y. 
1982). 
This assessment is also informative because it demonstrates that the Court showed no 
hesitation about deriving an officer's subjective motivation based upon non-testimonial fac-
tors. The Court did not deny that Officer Kraft's testimony did not explicitly state a concern 
for public safety. 467 U.S. at 653. Nonetheless, the Court contemplates throughout its opin-
ion that Officer Kraft was genuinely concerned about the danger that a missing gun may 
pose. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. The Court therefore was willing to deter-
mine subjective motivation based upon non-testimonial factors alone. 
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ant's intent as an element of a crime.118 When examining a defend-
ant's intent, courts may only pay cursory attention to his testimony 
and more thoroughly examine his objective conduct.· For example, 
if a defendant testifies that he was under duress when he committed 
a crime, evidence that he was not genuinely afraid - such as objec-
tive evidence that he acted calmly - would be dispositive of an 
actual intent to commit the crime of his own volition.119 Similarly, 
the courts can examine an arresting officer's intent through external 
factors. 
B. The Reasonableness of a Reasonableness Requirement 
The arresting officer may honestly believe in the presence of an 
exigent danger, but the court .must examine that belief closely in 
order to prevent expansion of the Quarles exception. An exception 
based solely on the subjective motivation of the questioning officer 
may end up swallowing the "narrow exception to the Miranda rule" 
created by the Quarles court.120 In order to rein in the exception, 
courts should apply a set of simple, objective guidelines that no of-
ficer may violate. 
The officer's belief must be reasonable primarily to guard 
against two sets of police officers. The first set is the Barney 
Fifes,121 those rare, easily scared police officers who will perceive 
danger in just about any situation. If the exception relied only upon 
the officer's actual concern, these officers might never give Miranda 
warnings due to their easily triggered fear. 
The second set is the Johll Kellys, 122 the veteran police officers 
who know how to exploit the letter of the law to their advantage. 
Absent a requirement that the situation be reasonably dangerous, 
these officers could fake an actual concern for safety by carefully 
fulfilling the subjective motivation prong of this Note's test. For 
example, they could immediately interrogate a suspect with a single 
question regarding a generic safety concern and then instantly give 
the Miranda warnings afterward. Without a reasonableness re-
quirement to measure actual concern, these officers' Miranda warn-
ings would likely begin: "Where's the gun? You have the right to 
118. Cf. Pizzi, supra note 14, at 583 ("[J]ust as the heart of criminal law is a question of 
intent, in determining whether an officer has violated the Constitution, the logical starting 
point must be an understanding of what the officer was trying to do."). 
119. See Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, supra note 45, at 149 (stating that "the 
[Quarles] majority nowhere explains why a desire 'to obtain incriminating evidence' should 
be harder to detect than so metaphysical a notion as a 'will overborne' "). 
120. 467 U.S. at 658. 
121. Named after the extremely nervous deputy played by Don Knotts on The Andy 
Griffith Show (CBS television broadcast, 1960-68). 
122. Named after the detective played by David Caruso on NYPD Blue (ABC television 
broadcast, 1993-present). · 
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remain silent .... " Even a loose requirement that an officer's con-
cern must be reasonable - for example, that the officer had a rea-
son to suspect an emergency - will eliminate just about all of these 
pretextual situations. Additionally, a court that carefully limits the 
officer's questioning to the perceived danger - as mandated by 
section 11.B - can eliminate questions about generic safety 
concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
On its face, inquiry concerning an officer's subjective motivation 
seems desirable; it is sensible to require an officer to base his ac-
tions on a belief that he is acting legally. After all, the legal system 
can only deter violations of constitutional rights that an officer ra-
tionally commits. In addition, an analysis of an officer's subjective 
motivation at the crime site is particularly desirable with respect to 
an exception that relies on the presence of an actual emergency. 
Without having to prove his actual concern for public safety, an of-
ficer could unwarrantedly ask certain questions, later state that an 
emergency existed, and then provide illegally acquired evidence -
perhaps a gun found as a result of the interrogation - as post hoc 
proof of an emergency. 
Ironically, fear of a similar post hoc justification by police of-
ficers has generally prevented courts from overtly analyzing subjec-
tive motivation. Courts are understandably afraid that officers may 
distort the truth about their on-site motivation and consistently pro-
claim in court that an actual concern for safety motivated their 
questioning. It is precisely this suspicion that keeps many courts 
from openly asking officers exactly what they were thinking at the 
arrest scene. 
This Note, however, enumerates several objective criteria that 
courts may use to determine whether concern for an emergency ac-
tually motivated an arresting officer. Courts can evaluate these fac-
tors to determine an officer's subjective motivation and free 
themselves from having to rely upon the officer's often self-serving 
testimony. Admittedly, the presence of these criteria is not a per-
fect confirmation that the officer actually believed in an emergency 
situation; it is conceivable that an officer might satisfy these criteria 
despite no belief in an emergency. The absence of this objective 
evidence indicating actual concern, however, is almost conclusive 
evidence that an emergency did not motivate the officer. Addition-
ally, this Note requires that the police officer have an objective rea-
son to believe in an emergency in order to prevent disingenuous 
assertions of proper motivation. 
Evaluating an officer's subjective motivation may not be practi-
cable for all potential constitutional violations, but this Note main-
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tains that subjective inquiry is wholly appropriate when a public 
safety emergency allegedly prompts interrogation by an officer. 
The officer's subjective motivation is relatively easy to determine 
because his questioning technique acts as a window into his thought 
process. Furthermore, the officer's motivation takes on an added 
relevance in the context of an exigency-based exception; if an emer-
gency is to justify suspension of Miranda rights, certainly an officer 
should actually believe in the emergency. This Note facilitates the 
determination of the officer's true motivation in these situations. 
